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However, the unravelling argument is extremely sensitive to any uncertainty concerning what the informed party actually knows. Take a simple example. Suppose you are buying a secondhand car from a dealer and you ask the dealer whether the car has been in an accident. Suppose further that the dealer replies that he does not know. In most cases, this reply leaves open two possibilities. Either the dealer knows that the car has been in an accident but is holding back this information, or the dealer is genuinely uninformed as to whether the car has been in an accident. If both possibilities have positive probability, the unravelling argument has no force. The professed ignorance of the dealer cannot be taken to be a sure indication of inferior quality. There is a positive probability that the dealer is actually telling the whole truth. In this sense, the unravelling argument unravels when there is uncertainty concerning the information of the informed party. The market's reaction to the published accounts of firms would seem to be a prime example of a case in which there is precisely this sort of uncertainty.
In principle, it is possible to incorporate uncertainty concerning the quality of the informed party's information by expanding the space of uncertainty from the payoff-relevant state space S to the product space S X Ao, where g is the set of information partitions over S. In this way, we could incorporate uncertainty over the information partitions of the informed party. The challenge is to keep the analysis tractable. In this article I shall take up this challenge, and I exhibit a class of pricing rules that can be defined in terms of a probability distribution over the payoff-relevant state space S alone. The uncertainty over g enters as a parameter in the distribution over S.
The setting for this article is an exchange economy in which traders face uncertainty concerning the quality of the informed party's information. Trading takes place in a "persuasion game" in the manner of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . The uncertainty over the quality of the informed party's information is captured by a set of probabilities with which the informed party receives a set of specified signals on the value of a firm. In effect, these probabilities serve as a measure of the severity of adverse selection in the market for the firm. What is of interest to us is that in equilibrium, any change in the severity of adverse selection is met with a commensurate shift in the attitude of the traders in interpreting the disclosures of the informed party. Thus, once we have solved for the equilibrium value of the firm as a function of these probabilities, we may regard these probabilities as a measure of the degree of skepticism in greeting the disclosures of the informed party.
There are two polar cases of this equilibrium. At one end is the case of extreme skepticism, as discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Farrell (1986) , in which the market "assumes the worst" and places all weight on the least favorable state for the informed party. The limiting case in the other direction is the case of naive updating by Bayes' rule on the ex ante probabilities. This is the case in which the disclosures are taken at face value. In general, I obtain a partial ordering of equilibrium outcomes with the above cases as the two extrema. The ordering has the interpretation "The market places more credence in the disclosures in equilibrium a than in equilibrium b."
One potential application of the results in this article is to the explanation of divergent price/earnings ratios for firms that are otherwise similar. It is well known that there is scope for "managing" the earnings figures for a firm within any given set of accounting conventions. More recently in the United Kingdom, a series of well-publicized corporate collapses has stimulated debate on the extent to which the balance sheet gives an accurate indication of a firm's underlying health. This debate has galvanized the accounting regulators into introducing ever more stringent guidelines (see, for example, The Economist (1991)). The controversial revelations in Smith (1992) concerning the accounting practices of several prominent firms in the United Kingdom has fueled this debate (The Economist, 1992). The results in this article suggest that for a set of firms that are otherwise identical, low price/earnings ratios will be associated with a greater degree of (positive) skewness of earnings reports. This opens up the prospect of empirical investigations into the significance of news management in determining asset prices.
The next section describes the persuasion game and its solution. Section 3 deals with the comparative statics of this solution, and it draws out the observable features associated with shifts in the key parameter-the severity of adverse selection. Section 4 discusses the empirical hypothesis concerning the relationship between the earnings reports of firms and their price/earnings ratios.
2. The persuasion game * The setting for the game is a pure exchange economy with a finite number of states. There are N states, and the ith state is denoted by si. The state space is denoted by S. There is a single consumption good in this economy, and two types of assets. The firm is an asset x = (X1, X2, . . ., XN) which pays xi units of the consumption good in state i. I shall assume that x1 < X2 < ... < XN. Thus, states with higher indices represent "good" outcomes for the owners of the firm, and states with lower indices represent "bad" outcomes. There is also a stock of the risk-free asset. Each unit of the risk-free asset pays one unit of the consumption good in every state.
There are three players in the game: the manager of the firm and two shareholders of the firm, called shareholder 1 and shareholder 2. The manager is risk averse and is endowed with a fraction e > 0 of the firm. The two shareholders are risk neutral and hold identical portfolios consisting of exactly half of the total stock of the risk-free asset, and Before proceeding to the solution of the game, I shall comment on some of the salient features of the model. In constraining the manager to tell the truth concerning S, I am drawing on an implicit understanding that the manager's disclosures are verifiable at a later date by a third party, such as an auditor, who is able to impose a very large penalty on the manager if the earlier disclosure is exposed to be untrue. Provided that these penalties are large enough, no rational manager will violate the truth-telling condition in equilibrium. A similar rationale underlies the truth-telling constraint in the literature on "verfiable reports," which includes Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990).
The truth-telling constraint seems particularly appropriate for disclosures in the form of financial statements. Although managers may dress up the results in ways that place a firm's prospects in the best light possible, there are well-established accounting principles that impose broad limits on what is possible. These "generally accepted accounting principles" may differ from country to country, but the practitioners are aware of them, and the regulators scrutinize firms' practices for possible violations. Above all, the ultimate sanction is the legal one against fraud. Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985a Dye ( , 1985b are articles in the accounting literature that employ the truth-telling constraint for precisely this reason.
I also comment on the nature of the message announced by the manager. In my model, the manager announces that the firm's true value lies in some interval of the payoffrelevant state space S. Taken literally, this may seem to be at variance with the way information is usually conveyed in financial accounts. However, when we consider the informational content of the report, rather than its superficial form, the assumption is seen to be without loss of generality. In any disclosure game between an informed and an uninformed party, the equilibrium reporting strategy will generate a partition of the relevant sample space, and the receiver of the information will update by Bayes' rule on this partition. Hence, in terms of the informational content of the report, the description of the announcement in terms of the message space is equivalent to its description in terms of the relevant subsets of the sample space. Dye (1985b) argues for this general approach in the analysis of accounting disclosures. The only substantial assumption involved in my model is that announcements are of intervals of the set S. This is a restriction, but the corresponding gain in terms of the simplicity of the model would seem to justify its use. Future work may examine relaxing this assumption.
Let us now turn to the solution of the game. In solving this game, I appeal to a general pricing rule for the firm that can be deduced from the optimal strategies of the two shareholders. For any given announcement of V by shareholder 1, shareholder 2 compares V with the expected value of x given the manager's reporting strategy and nature's experiments. Since shareholder 2 is risk neutral, if this expected value is greater than V, she prefers the firm to the risk-free asset and buys shareholder l's holding of the firm. If V is greater than this expected value, she prefers the risk-free asset and sells her share of the firm to shareholder 1. Since the two shareholders have identical preferences, the unique best reply for shareholder 1 is to set V equal to the expected value of x given the manager's reporting strategy and nature's experiments.
More formally, consider the product space S X A, where & is the set of all nonempty intervals of S representing all possible announcements of the manager. We can define a probability distribution over S X A generated by nature's experiments and the manager's reporting strategy. Denote this distribution by ju. Thus, ,t(s, A) is the probability that the true state is s and the manager announces the event A. Since the only information available to the shareholders is the manager's announcement, the shareholders calculate the expected value of x from the conditional distribution lu( I A). Thus, in equilibrium, if the manager announces the event A, we have V = Exkgu(sk I A). This is the pricing rule underlying the k solution of the game. The bulk of the work involved in solving the game consists in deriving an explicit expression for the conditional distribution g( I A).
However, one immediate conclusion we may draw is that the strategy of telling the "whole truth" is never an equilibrium strategy for the manager. The argument is as follows. Suppose, for contradiction, that the manager's equilibrium strategy is to tell the whole truth-that is, to set A = I in (4) and (5). By the equilibrium pricing rule, V is set equal to the expectation of x according to k(t I A). However, if the manager reveals all his information, g(t I A) is identical to the conditional distribution on A with respect to the ex ante probabilities (Pig P2' ... 9 PN). But then, for any interval I = {si, si+I, . . ., Sk} in the range of the reporting strategy where k < N, the manager can do strictly better by announcing the interval A = {sig, si+, ... , Sk, ... , SN}. To see this, partition A into {I, A I} and consider the conditional expectation of x on I and on A I I, respectively. Since x1 < X2 < ... < XN, the latter is strictly greater. Since the conditional expectation of x on A is a convex combination of that on I and A I I with nonzero weights, the manager can do strictly better by announcing A than by announcing I. But this contradicts the initial supposition that telling the whole truth is an equilibrium strategy. This feature of our persuasion game is in contrast to the fully revealing equilibria of Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Farrell (1986) , and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990).
Having verified that the equilibria of our game involve at least some news management, let us focus on a class of equilibria that differ markedly in character from earlier articles. Far from the informed party revealing all available information, there is a chronic problem of news management in this class of equilibria. As with earlier articles on the persuasion game, my solution concept is sequential equilibrium, due to Kreps and Wilson (1982) . My choice of solution concept is motivated by the natural requirement that the informed party cannot commit to a reporting strategy before receipt of the private information. This would seem to be an essential feature of the problem I am examining. I introduce the term "sanitization strategy" to denote the strategy of the manager in which every "good" realization of a signal is announced but every "bad" realization is Two comments are in order concerning the equilibrium described in Theorem 1. First, the equilibrium price of the firm is determined by a probability distribution over S only. The uncertainty surrounding the quality of the manager's information enters as a parameter in this distribution.
The second point is of more general interest. It is worthy of note that the shareholders are updating their beliefs on S by conditioning on a set of events that do not form a partition of S. In other words, the shareholders have nonpartitional information structures. Nonpartitional information structures have been examined in a series of recent articles, including Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Samet (1990 
Since E(x I B) is a convex combination of E(x IX) and E(x IY) while E,(x I A) is a convex combination of E(x IY) and E(x IZ), we have E,(x I A) ' E(x I B). Thus, the sanitization strategy is a best reply for the manager against V = E,(x I A)
. Now let us turn to the shareholders' strategies. I have already noted that, given shareholder 2's trading strategy, the unique best reply for shareholder 1 is to set V equal to the expected value of x given the manager's reporting strategy and nature's experiments. I shall show that this expected value is equal to E,(x I A) when the manager announces the event A.
For the probability distribution u(*, ) over S X A generated by nature's experiments and the manager's sanitization strategy, consider the probability that the manager announces the interval A conditional on the true state being sj. Denote this conditional probability by g(A I j). 3. Comparative statics of skepticism * Let us now turn to the comparative statics of the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 with respect to shifts in the probabilities Oi. Since these are the probabilities with which the manager receives signals on the value of the firm, they can be seen as a measure of the severity of adverse selection in the market. What is of interest to us is that shifts in these probabilities will be met with commensurate shifts in the attitudes of the shareholders to the manager's announcements, so that in equilibrium, these probabilities will serve as a measure of the degree of skepticism in the market. A number of empirical predictions arise from such shifts of attitude, and it is these that we pursue here.
Denote by 0 the vector (02, 03, ... , ON) . By the structure of the game, the set of admissible values of 0 is the interior of the unit cube in RN-1. A limiting case of 0 that is of particular interest as a benchmark is the case in which 0 tends to the vector (1, 1, ... , 1) . In this limiting case, the manager knows the true state at the announcement stage, and prices are those associated with the "skeptical equilibrium" of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . That is, for a given announcement A by the manager, the market's skepticism will be more pronounced for parameter 0 than for 0, in the sense that the same disclosure leads to a lower valuation of the firm. The proof of this theorem appeals to first-degree stochastic dominance of the distribution X over v. Define the complementary cumulative distribution function The main empirical hypothesis suggested by Theorems 2 and 3 is that the disclosure profiles of firms provide information on the degree of credence placed on the firm's reports. In particular, we have seen that a firm with a lower level of credence has a disclosure profile with a greater degree of skewness to the right-toward the good states for the firm. At the same time, we know from Theorem 2 that for a given news event, a firm with lower credence is priced at a lower level than an equivalent firm with higher credence. The empirical counterpart to this would be that a firm with lower credence has a lower price/earnings ratio. I thus propose the following empirical hypothesis.
Hypothesis. For a set of firms that are otherwise identical, low price/earnings ratios are associated with a greater degree of positive skewness in the distribution of earnings reports.
Actual empirical tests of this hypothesis will be feasible once we have settled on a procedure for standardizing the earnings figures between firms in order to make the comparisons across firms meaningful. Many issues of interest would seem to arise in implementing this empirical project, and would be worthy of a systematic empirical investigation.
